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The terms here used, "fictions," and "lies," can be or are disquieting. They cut the ground of positive as well as positivistic meaning from under our feet. Indeed, at one point, I was ready to indulge in the stratagem of substitution stratagem for these terms. But that would have been neither fiction nor lie; that would have been rank deception. We shall have to grasp the nettle. "Fictions are," Kermode wrote, "our humanly ordered picture of the world." I would add, or any part of that world, that whole. Taking this seriously, we may argue that the truthfulness (not the truth) of fictions is their conceptual usefulness within the limitations of our present experience as that present experience bears within itself our past experience as well. Ihde, writing of phenomenology, commented:
In its Husserlian beginnings [it] was thought of as a new "science of experience" beginning in descriptive psychology. If the science metaphor is understood in its best sense as an open-ended, exploratory, exciting in discovery, interrogation which results not in leaving things as they were, then it is indeed appropriate. Perhaps phenomenology is like science in another sense as well. To perform as a creative theoretical thinker it is necessary to change perspective. The scientific thinker must abandon or at least suspend certain long held and habitual beliefs about things. He must begin to think in a new and often radically different way.
He must, if I may summarize what Ihde has written, tell a "lie." To continue:
The "common man" of the Copernican era insofar as his positivistic holding to his earthbound perspective holds, was quite correct in insisting that the sun sets and rises. But he also fails to see the possibility of inhabiting a different perspective, the imaginative perspective which places the thinker at that point which allows one to "see" that the earth moves around the sun.6 Or, anticipating a further discussion, the Russian formalist Sklovskij observed that the role of art-not merely of science-is delivery from mere recognizing, i.e., re-cognizing, back to seeing.7
Perhaps the role of Kermode's "fictions" or Ihde's "lies" may be more clearly recognized through Kermode's distinction between fiction and myth.
Myth operates within the diagrams of ritual, which presupposes total and adequate explanation of things as they are and were; it is a sequence of radically unchangeable gestures. Fictions are for finding things out and they change as the needs of sense-making change. Myths are the agents of stability, fictions, the agents of change.8 creation. That this is an explanation of the text cannot be gainsaid. But for Spinoza, who undoubtedly knew it, for Astruc and for others it no longer gave, in Kermode's words, "some show of satisfaction to the mind."
What we are called upon to recognize is the difference between the situation in which the author of the midrash functioned-no later than the sixth century of this era-and that of the seventeenth century. Times had changed and with that change the vast structure of fictions that had made sense of Scriptures no longer satisfied man in the middest of that change.
The Sea of Faith [in Arnold's words] was once, too, at the full and round earth's shore Lay like the folds of a bright girdle furled. But now I only hear Its melancholy, long withdrawing roar Retreating, to the breath Of the night-wind, down the vast edges drear And naked shingles of the world.10
The fictions that were for finding out had become the myths and myths were not enough. To dispel what it saw as the old miasmal myth was the task the nineteenth century imposed upon itself. New sense had to be made of what was now, for the gebildete Mensch, no longer sacred Scripture, a single seamless text from Genesis through the Apocalypse, but a sprawling corpus of Hebrew, with some Aramaic thrown in, and Greek texts. It was either that or, as some preferred, interment decently, perhaps even regretfully, on the shelves of libraries or, more radically, casting with little regard on the midden heap of history the corpse of these now outworn texts.
What tools were available for sense-making? Here one must attend to the fact that, for whatever reasons, much of this took place on the European continent, first and foremost in Germany. It was in Germany that the study of texts, of the texts of classical antiquity, had been and was being developed into what was thought to be a science. One Philology is composed of history just as much as of natural science or aesthetics: history, insofar as it endeavors to comprehend manifestations of the individualities of peoples in ever new images, and the prevailing law in the disappearance of phenomena; natural science, insofar as it strives to fathom the deepest instinct of man, that of speech; aesthetics, finally, because from various antiquities at our disposal it endeavors to pick out the so-called "classical" antiquity, with the view and pretention of excavating the ideal world buried under it and to hold up to the present the mirror of the classical and everlasting standards....
We may consider antiquity from a scientific point of view; we may try to look at what has happened with the eye of a historian, or to arrange and compare the linguistic forms of ancient masterpieces, to bring them at all events under a morphological law; but we always lose the wonderful creative force, the real fragrance, of the atmosphere of antiquity; we forget the passionate emotion that instinctively drove our meditation and enjoyment back to the Greeks...
The entire scientific and artistic movement of this peculiar centaur is bent, though with cyclopic slowness, upon bridging over the gulf between the ideal antiquity . . . and the real antiquity; thus classic philology pursues only the final end of its own being which is the fusing together of primarily hostile impulses that have only forcibly been brought together.
That a few years later, in the third lecture of the series, "The Future of our Educational Institutions,"17 he saw the enterprise in a different light is also enlightening. There he said:
Another tracks down with the distrustful eye of a policeman every contradiction, every shadow of a contradiction of which Homer was guilty; he fritters his life away tearing homeric rags to tatters and stitching them together again; rags he himself stole from the magnificent robe . The rules are quite simple: suspend explanations; describe. Ihde wrote: "Phenomenology calls for the suspension of 'theories' which attempt to go behind or under experience, for a suspension of 'constructs' which are elaborated to account for such and such a phenomenon." In short, bracket out the fiction, the myth that makes sense out of experience and return to experience; in our situation, return to the text. Yet this return, it seems to me, is not to the state of tabula rasa. Ihde suggests there is no "'pure' experience." The rule is intended to direct one's "looking" or in our case, I would say, our hearing. "It is a call to center one's focus on the 'thing itself."' It is intended as well to make us aware by means of this "purposeful suspension of our habitual explanations ... how powerful and constant these taken for granted predispositions are." Or again, how we have forgotten how fictive our fictions are.
The second rule is that of varying possibilities. "One seeks to exhaust, insofar as possible, the full range of possibilities lying within any given region of investigation." It is the narrowing of that range of possibilities that has, I suggest, given rise to our scholiasticism, our stasis, our crisis. Again, it must be admitted that one cannot exhaust possibilities. What the rule calls for rather is "further to open the field of investigation and to preclude too rapid closure."
The third rule: seek structures. Again, to quote Ihde, one "seeks not only the richness of experience, but its 'shape'.... Variations are supposed to gradually reveal those structures both in terms of their boundaries and in terms of their characteristic features." Such an approach is to bring one at last face to face with the "resistant of the invariant." It is at this point that I begin to become uneasy, but I am reassured that "not all invariants are clear and distinct....
There are 'inexact essences' just as there are 'concepts with blurred edges."' In other words, the structures we discovered are, more than possibly, fictions that make sense for now, for us who have opened ourselves to "the full range of possibilities," whose conceptual usefulness is their truthfulness for us.21
These rules are, as I have indicated, afterthought. I did not begin my particular intellectual journey with phenomenological theory. I began, however, phenomenologically. Academic autobiography is, I recognize, both infra dig. and de trop, yet I have never forgotten what I heard Victor Lenzen, the famed physicist and philosopher, tell the Philosophy Union in the University of California, Berkeley, almost fifty years ago: the presence of the observer changes the nature of that which is observed. How I find out what I find out as I am involved with a text may, in the long run, be as important or even more important than the results. Indeed, and this is a mere aside, a part of our stasis may be due to the fact that how we find out is as dreary as what we find out. As an aside within an aside, part of our pedagogical problem may be that our students have never found out how we found out what if anything we find out.
Last year, in commenting on Robert Polzin's Moses and the Deuteron- I have indulged in this autobiographical unscientific prescript only to make clear that I am not offering a universal panacea but only an approach to a problem. If I argue phenomenological reductionism as at least a helpful undertaking in our situation it is because like Moliere's character who was amazed to learn he had all along been speaking prose, I learned to my amazement that what I had been forced to do by my scholarly tasks in order to make sense involved phenomenological reduction. I was forced to listen to the text in an unanticipated way. In doing so I have become ever more aware of the possibility of regarding and so dealing with and understanding biblical texts as-whatever else they are-works of literary art using the techniques of that art for their purposes. This means, of course, that they are subject to canons of literary criticism or, to remain true to the suggestions with which I began, to sense-making fictions, to truthful "lies."
But which particular fictions? Which conceptually useful "lies"? I do not intend to recite for you the present possibilities. I have acquired seven or more years of protocols of an exciting, provocative and challenging inter-disciplinary seminar on structuralism. I now have the beginnings of a shelf of volumes intended to make it possible to save the text. I have listened earnestly to the discussions that have taken place here at the Society's meetings during the past several years. These and more have offered and shall continue to offer themselves to us as ways of, I hope, listening to the text. It is and will continue to be our responsibility to search among them, to examine them, to test and to judge them, with the expectation that each may in some sense "open up new vistas of thought," indeed, save us from writing the biblical from the standpoint of the preposition.24 24 Cf. Barbara Johnson, The Critical Difference (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1980) xi-xii: 'Theoretical pronouncements therefore do not stand here as instruments to be used in mastering literary structures. On the contrary, it is through contact with literature that theoretical tools are useful precisely to the extent that they hereby change and dissolve in the hands of the user. Theory is here often the straight man whose precarious rectitude and hidden risibility, passion, and pathos are precisely what literature has somehow already foreseen. For literary stages the modes of its own misreading, making visible the literarity of the heart of the theory and rendering the effects of its project of understanding unpredictable. The rhetorical subversion of theory by its own discourse does not, however, prevent it from generating effects; indeed, it is precisely the way theory misses its target that produces incalculable and interesting effects elsewhere." Instead of such a survey I shall offer some listenings to the text based on a somewhat less modish-that is not meant pejoratively-program. One is certainly a creature of one's experience and, as you recognize, what I experienced in the situation described above was art or artistry as technique. I intend to pursue that theme, not to suggest the exclusion of any other, but because it is congenial and because I think formal considerations may be laid out more clearly than others no less germane.
In an essay "Iskusstvo kak priem" ("Art as Technique"), published in Poetika25 in 1919, Viktor Sklovskij began by discussing the problem of the economy of means in language, pointing out how habituation leads to automatization so that "in ordinary speech we leave phrases unfinished and words unexpressed." He wrote of an algebraizing mode of thought in which an object is apprehended by number and place. "We do not see it but recognize it by its primary characteristics." The result is that "automatization swallows up the thing, the clothing, the furniture, the woman, even the horrors of war." He quoted Tolstoi: "When the complexity of life passes by, unnoticed by many, then such life is as though it had not been." Art, on the contrary, Sklovskij argued, is just that which restores the experience of life. "Art exists that one may recover the sensation of life; it exists to make one feel things; to make the stone stonier." How does art accomplish this? The underlying act of art, its essential technique is, for Sklovskij, "alienation," "distancing."
The goal of art is to help someone experience an object as being seen not as being recognized. The technique of art is the technique of the "alienation" of the object, the technique of form-made-difficult; a technique that increases the difficulty of and the duration of perception, for the process of perception is art's own goal and must be prolonged. is masculine, hence the verb must be; or saving the verb, a feminine noun must be sought. No attention is paid to the hollow "o" of n1Kn followed by a glottal stop and the falling "e" set between the fading aspirated bet and dalet, all of which conspire in the meaning "perish." I do not intend to belabor this point but merely to indicate "automatization," not listening to the text, has led more often than we imagine to "the happy knack of emending." I wish we had time to examine further the impact on our hearing of the text of Sklovskij's discussion of poetic language:
If we examine poetic language both in terms of its stock of sounds and words as well as in terms of its ordering of words and of the structures of meaning that are constructed out of those words, we encounter in every instance the same artistic trait: it is consciously fashioned to provide a perception free of automatization; the goal of the creator is that this artistry be seen and it is made "artistic" so that perception will linger on it in order that it reach to its greatest possible force and duration, so that things will not be perceived spatially but in their continuity.... According to Aristotle, poetic language must possess the characteristics of foreignness, strangeness; it is often of foreign origin, Sumerian in Assyrian, Latin in medieval Europe, Arabian in Persian, old Bulgarian as the foundation of Russian literary language [to which may be added Ugaritic in Psalms]; or it is an elevated language as in folk-songs that approach literary language. Here, too, belong the archaisms of poetic language, the complex language of the dolce stil nuovo (xii cent).... L. Jakubinskij ... pointed to the law of complexity for poetic phonetics in the particular instance of the repetition of similar sounds. Thus poetic language is a difficult, complex, sloweddown language....
Thus we arrive at a definition of the poetic as retarded, bowed language. It is composed language. Prose [by which he means non-artistic language] is ordinary language: economical, easy, regular (dea prosae is the goddess of childbirth, free of complications).28
Let us not depend, however, upon the insight of one critic alone. I call your attention to what a practicing poet, Edith Sitwell, wrote of her sequence "FaCade":
It was said that the images in the poems were strange. This is partly the result of condensement-partly because where the language of one sense was insufficient to cover the meaning, the sensation, I used the language of another, and by this means attempted to pierce down to the essence of the thing seen by discovering in it attributes which at first sight appear alien but which are actually related-by producing its quintessential color (sharper, brighter, than that which can be seen by an eye grown stale) and by stripping it of all unessential details.29
Or finally in this connection I remind you of Ian Ramsey's concept of the increasing oddness of religious language, an oddness that inhibits automatization and allows new meaning to break out at last. It is from this or these concurrent vantage points that we must listen to the text and so doing discover how much we have missed.
All of this and more represent the role of technique on the semantic level of the text. Now I shall further try your patience as I turn to another level, that which structuralists refer to as the deep structure but which I, following for the time being Sklovskij, shall refer to as plot. I do not intend to summarize either of the two essays in which Sklovskij discusses the technique of plot construction, for my intention is neither to exhaust the subject nor you, but rather to tempt or to cajole you into undertaking for yourselves that phenomenological reduction I have discussed earlier. Yet I am bound to suggest something of the breadth of what Sklovskij discussed, before turning to a very specific aspect of that whole. In the essay "The Continuity between the Techniques of Plot Construction and Stylistic Techniques,"30 he was concerned to show that what is done on the semantic level has its counterpart or counterparts at the level of structure, i.e., plot. He takes us step by parallel step through these two realms. As an example, he suggested that repetition on the semantic level-my examples, the three-fold occurrence of lrn in Psalm 1 or the six-fold repetition of the labial mem, etc., in the verse from Judges-has its parallel on the structural or plot level. At the very center of his consideration of the concept of plot is the technique of step construction, that slowing down so that one may experience rather than merely recognize.
Practical thinking aims at generalization, the construction of the broadest possible, most inclusive formulae. Art on the contrary "with its thirst for the concrete" (Carlyle) rests on steps and the fragmentation of even that which occurs as generalization and unity. Repetition with its special case of rhyme is part of step construction as are tautology, tautological parallelism, psychological parallelism, retardation, epic repetition, narrative ritual, perepetia and many other plot devices. I noted this, for although there are some time-markers, in Gen 12:4 Abram's age is given as seventy-five; in Gen 16:3 we are told that he had lived in the land ten years, which would make him eighty-five; in Gen 16:16, following the birth of Ishmael he is eighty-six; but in the very next verse, Gen 17:1, he is ninety-nine. This suggests that prosaic time, in this case historical time, is of no particular interest to the author. We are facing literary time whose pace is determined by the requirements of plot. Thus the thirteen year gap between Gen 16:16 and Gen 17:1 is a non-scene that allows us to move rapidly to the next plot episode.
To return to Abram's journeying "by stages toward the Negeb"; this is brought to a close by "a famine in the land"-another motif used later on to forward the plot. Abram and Sarai descend into Egypt where Sarai is abducted by the ruler. Although I use the term "abducted" I do not consider it to be a motif but rather one of the modes of presenting a significant motif, "the chosen wife." This motif reappears in the Isaac episode and in the Jacob sequence. Here, and in its repetition in chapter 20, it is intended to indicate and to emphasize that Sarai is destined to be the mother of the true heir. The sister-not-wife stratagem that ostensibly is intended to deliver Abram from danger heightens the tension by suddenly placing her in jeopardy; were she possessed sexually by Pharaoh she would be excluded from that role. Divine intervention on her behalf emphasizes her significance.
The return from Egypt is accompanied by a return to the scene of Lot who is still, despite the promise and despite Sarai's escape (she is still childless), the putative heir. "But now," wrote Speiser, "the two must part since each requires a large grazing and watering radius for his flocks and herds."34 In terms of pastoral economics this may be so; in terms of plot, hardly. The two must part in order that Lot be removed from further consideration. He has served his teasing role and must now, as an heir of Terah, be given a portion and be dismissed from the plot although not from the narrative. He will reappear in a diversionary, i.e., a retarding, novella later on. Now, indeed it would seem, is the propitious moment for the advent of the true heir; instead, the plot is retarded by a long diversion, the tale of the war with the five kings and the encounter with Melchizedek. Yet even the detour may serve a further purpose in terms of the plot. Abram's renunciation of spoil suggests that the true heir is to receive nothing that is not a part of the divine gift. His inheritance is not to be commingled with anything else. This motif will appear again. This episode is followed by the third encounter with Deity in which there is a reaffirmation of the gift. Abram replies that he has no offspring, that his slave will be his inheritor, Lot having been disposed of. To this the reply comes that his "very own issue shall be his heir." The reaffirmation of the gift, "this land," is sealed by a covenantal act and by the disclosure of events that are to happen to his descendants in the future. Yet the immediate sequel is: "Sarai, Abram's wife, did not bear for him," and the teasing motif of the presumed heir is renewed. Sarai presents her slave woman to Abram; she conceives his "very own issue." Is the promise fulfilled? Is this child to be his heir? Sarai, whom we have been led to believe is the chosen wife, is apparently displaced and in her angry response so mistreats Hagar that she flees, only to be met by a divine messenger who reassures her that she is to bear a son; the heir? although the remainder of the message is less than reassuring. Hagar bears a son, Ishmael. Abram has his heir! Here the matter rests for thirteen unreported years. Then, as noted, in Abram's ninety-ninth year there is a fourth encounter with the Deity, to renew once again the covenant, to confirm the gift and to confound the conclusion that Ishmael is the heir with the promise that he, now Abraham, shall father and Sarai, now Sarah, shall bear the true heir. Abraham's response, "he laughed and said to himself . . . ," introduces a motif that echoes through several changes, one almost immediately. As indicated, the second true heir cycle began with the genealogy in Gen 22:30. I do not, however, intend to follow it through and shall make only two comments for I wish to turn to a far more intricate plotting in connection with the sons of Jacob. Although, to quote Speiser, "Isaac ... can scarcely be described as a memorable personality," remember that in plot personality is of no great significance. The second cycle is, however, something more than (again to quote Speiser) "a restful interlude between the story of Abraham and the story of Jacob."35 The very same tension with false starts and retardations is there, although the number of episodes is certainly fewer. Further, the repeated episode of deception with regard to the chosen wife rather than being a mere faded triplet of that motif suggests, coming as it does after the birth of the twins, that Rebecca, far from being an ancillary figure now that the children are born, is to play a significant role in the unfolding of the plot.
We turn now to the plot of the True Heir as it is laid out in the third cycle, that of the sons of Jacob. To begin with, the cast of characters has enlarged considerably, making the task of plotting far more complicated. I have burdened you with this particular, even peculiar account of a story well-known to you because, to return to the thesis propounded much earlier, it seems to me that one of the ingredients in the failure of the fiction we call the Documentary Hypothesis was its inability or its unwillingness to understand and interpret how the text was put together. Seams and joins are the best we have been able to come up with. "The magnificent robe" was, in Nietzsche's words, "torn . . . into tatters" without attending to the question of how in the first place the robe was woven. A description of the plot is, on the other hand, an attempt to show how indeed the "author" worked. Sklovskij, describing a particular novel to which I shall revert, wrote:
This entirely heterogeneous material, burdened by voluminous excerpts from the works of various pedants, could undoubtedly have torn the novel apart. For that reason it is drawn together by means of pervading motifs. A particular motif may not be fully developed or realized but from time to time it is recalled; its realization is always put off until later. Yet only its presence during the entire length of the novel ties its episodes together. At the conclusion of the essay he wrote, "Too often one confuses the concept of the plot with the description of events, that is, with what I provisionally call Fable. In reality this Fable is only the material out of which the plot is fashioned."37 But, to see only the Fable and never the plot; to be concerned only with the Fable and what it may be saying outside of the plot, if one can discover that, in our case the history of Israel as disclosed by the Fable, has become and is a significant source of our disillusionment, if not our crisis. By this contrivance the machinery of my work is of a species by itself; two contrary motions are introduced into it, and reconciled, which were thought to be at variance with each other. In a word, my work is digressive, and it is progressive too,-and at the same time . . . Digressions, incontestably, are the sunshine;-they are the life, the soul of reading!-take them out of this book, for instance-you might as well take the book along with them;-one cold eternal winter night would reign in every page of it; restore them to the writer;-he steps forth like a bridegroom,-bids Allhail; brings in variety, and forbids the appetite to fail.
All the dexterity is in the good cookery and management of them, so as to be not only for the advantage of the reader, but also of the author, whose distress, in this matter, is truly pitiable. For, if he begins a digression,-from that moment, I observe, his whole work stands stock still,-and if he goes on with his main work,-then there is an end of his digression.
-This is vile work. 
